HENRY P. DAVID
J. C. BRENGELMANN

Perspectives in Personality Research

Perspectives in Personality Research

Perspectives in Personality Research

Edited by HENRY P. DAVID, Ph.D.

and

J. C. BRENGELMANN, M.D., Ph.D.

under the auspices of the

International Union of Scientific Psychology



Springer Science+Business Media, LLC

ISBN 978-3-662-39598-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-39598-1

Copyright © 1960 Springer Science+Business Media New York Originally published by Springer Publishing Company, Inc. in 1960 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1960

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 60-10868

Type set at The Polyglot Press, New York

Contributors

ARTHUR M. ADLERSTEIN, Ph.D.

Neurological Research Center, Children's Hospital, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States

IRVING E. ALEXANDER, Ph.D.

Training Branch, National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda, Maryland, United States

LEONARDO ANCONA, Ph.D.

Professor of Psychology, Catholic University, Milan, Italy

GERALD S. BLUM. Ph.D.

Professor of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, United States

J. C. BRENGELMANN, M.D., Ph.D.

Institute of Psychiatry, Maudsley Hospital, London, England

HENRY P. DAVID, Ph.D.

Chief Psychologist and Psychology Consultant, N. J. State Department of Institutions and Agencies, Trenton, New Jersey, United States

NORMAN L. FARBEROW, Ph.D.

Central Research Unit, Veterans Administration Center, Los Angeles, California, United States

FRANZ G. FROM, Ph.D.

Professor of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

E. P. HOLLANDER, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Psychology, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, United States

BÄRBEL INHELDER, Ph.D.

Professor of Child Psychology, Institute J. J. Rousseau, University of Geneva, Switzerland

OTTO KLINEBERG, M.D., Ph.D.

Secretary-General, International Union of Scientific Psychology; Professor of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, New York, United States

A. R. LURIA, M.D., Ph.D.

Professor of Psychology, University of Moscow; Director, Research Section, Institute of Defectology, Academy of Pedagogical Science, Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

vi CONTRIBUTORS

ROBERT B. MACLEOD, Ph.D.

Professor of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, United States

NOËL MAILLOUX, Ph.D.

Treasurer, International Union of Scientific Psychology; Professor of Psychology, University of Montreal, Quebec, Canada

RICHARD MEILI, Ph.D.

Professor of Psychology, University of Bern, Switzerland

DANIEL R. MILLER, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, United States

LOIS B. MURPHY, Ph.D.

Research Psychologist, Menninger Foundation, Topeka, Kansas, United States

HENRY A. MURRAY, M.D., Ph.D.

Professor of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States

GERALD NOELTING, Ph.D.

Research Associate in Child Psychology, Institute J. J. Rousseau, University of Geneva, Switzerland

JOSEPH NUTTIN, Ph.D.

Professor of Psychology, University of Louvain, Belgium

WILLIAM RABINOWITZ, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor, Division of Research and Evaluation, Division of Teacher Education, Board of Higher Education, New York, New York, United States

EDWIN S. SHNEIDMAN, Ph.D.

Central Research Unit, Veterans Administration Center, Los Angeles, California, United States

AASE GRUDA SKARD, D.H.L.

Associate Professor of Psychology, University of Oslo, Norway

RONALD TAFT. Ph.D.

Reader in Psychology, University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia

RENATO TAGIURI, Ph.D.

Associate Professor, Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Boston, Massachusetts, United States

HANS THOMAE, Ph.D.

Professor of Psychology, University of Erlangen, Germany

SILVAN S. TOMKINS, Ph.D.

Professor of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, United States

Foreword

THREE YEARS AGO, when Perspectives in Personality Theory appeared under the editorship of Henry P. David and Helmut von Bracken, with contributions by twenty-two psychologists from nine different countries, I described it as "a real landmark in international cooperation among psychologists." All of us connected with the International Union of Scientific Psychology were delighted with this tangible expression of increased communication among psychologists, who too often remain content to read the writings of their own countrymen in their own language. Our pleasure was increased with the publication of the volume in German as well, thus widening even more the circle of international contact. The favorable reception accorded the first Perspectives was convincing proof that such publications met a real need in the psychological community, and the hope was expressed on many sides that what had succeeded so well would establish a precedent for the future. After all, psychologists are not usually content with just a single case!

It is therefore with even greater pleasure and pride that, in the name of the International Union of Scientific Psychology, I write these few words of introduction to the second volume. Perspectives in Personality Research, again edited by Henry P. David, this time in cooperation with J. C. Brengelmann, contains contributions from twenty-seven psychologists from eleven countries, an even wider range than that represented by its predecessor. We are indeed, in the happy phrase used by Joseph Nuttin as the title of his chapter, going "beyond provincialism." The distinguished scholars who have collaborated in this important undertaking have placed all of us in their debt, and our very special thanks go to the two editors who were responsible for the volume as a whole.

The International Union of Scientific Psychology, like *Perspectives*, is becoming more international. It now consists of

viii FOREWORD

twenty-six national societies, those of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, German Federal Republic, Great Britain, Holland, Israel, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United States, Uruguay, U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia. Associated organizations include the International Association of Applied Psychology, the Inter-American Society of Psychology, and the Society of French-Speaking Psychologists. It has consultative status with UNESCO, from which it receives a generous annual subvention, and for which it carries out specific tasks under contract. It is now engaged in conducting an extensive cross-national study of the development of national stereotypes in young children of different ages. It is also closely associated with the International Union of Biological Sciences (affiliated with the International Council of Scientific Unions), and the International Committee of Social Science Documentation.

The Union was founded in 1951 on the occasion of the International Congress in Stockholm, with Henri Piéron of France as the first president, and H. S. Langfeld of the United States as secretary-general. In 1954 when the Congress took place in Montreal, Canada, Jean Piaget of Switzerland was elected president, and three years later, in Brussels, he was succeeded by Albert Michotte of Belgium. The first *Perspectives* resulted primarily from papers and discussions presented on the occasion of the Montreal Congress, and the second volume is similarly related to the Congress which took place in Brussels. There is no guarantee that this pattern will continue indefinitely, but we are grateful for what we have already received. The editors and authors have made a contribution, in the truest and most literal sense, to international understanding.

Otto Klineberg
Columbia University
Secretary General
International Union of Scientific Psychology

Editors' Note

With the publication of *Perspectives in Personality Theory* in 1957, an idea conceived at the 1954 Montreal International Congress of Psychology had become reality. Colleagues from many lands had jointly demonstrated the international scope of their science and profession, and the International Union of Scientific Psychology was receiving modest royalties.

When a second volume was suggested at the 1957 Brussels Congress, and the editors were again urged to serve, von Bracken recommended Brengelmann as co-editor. Having previously presented the varied directions of personality theory, it now seemed appropriate to consider how theories are translated into empirical research.

Once more colleagues from many lands readily responded to our request to expand their Congress papers into reports of ongoing research. An equally gratifying response came from additional contributors invited to discuss their latest (1959) work. All of the material was then organized into appropriate sections with integrated commentaries and surveys of current personality research by distinguished psychologists. We are pleased that *Perspectives in Personality Research* will be published in time for the 1960 Bonn International Congress.

As before, there is much to acknowledge: the steadfast support of our colleagues, especially Robert MacLeod, Henry Murray, and Silvan Tomkins; the encouragement of the International Union and its Secretary-General, Otto Klineberg; the editorial counsel of David McClelland and Arthur Rosenthal; the secretarial assistance of the New Jersey State Department of Institutions and Agencies and the Maudsley Hospital; and, again, the understanding patience of our wives.

Trenton, New Jersey London, England January, 1960 H. P. D. J. C. B.

Contents

	Foreword Otto Klineberg	vii
	PART ONE-OVERVI	E W
I.	Historical Trends in Personality Research Henry A. Murray	3
	PART TWO-EXPLORATIONS IN BEHAVE	OR
II.	Studies of Denial in Fantasy Daniel R. Miller	43
III.	Studies in the Psychology of Death Irving E. Alexander and Arthur M. Adlerstein	65
IV.	A Clinical Study of Religious Attitudes and a New Approach to Psychopathology Noël Mailloux and Leonardo Ancona	93
V.	Psychoanalytic Behavior Theory: A Conceptual Framework for Research Gerald S. Blum	107
VI.	Experimental Analysis of the Development of Voluntary Action in Children A. R. Luria	139
VII.	Personality Research and Psychopathology: A Commentary Silvan S. Tomkins	150

PART THREE-PERSON PERCEPTION

VIII.	Perception of Human Action Franz From	161
IX.	Movement as a Cue in Person Perception Renato Tagiuri	175
X.	Judgment and Judging in Person Cognition Ronald Taft	196
XI.	Reconsidering the Issue of Conformity in Personality E. P. Hollander	210
XII.	Person Perception: A Commentary Robert B. MacLeod	226
	PART FOUR-RESOUR	CES
XIII.	Longitudinal Research in Personality Development Aase Grude Skard, with Bärbel Inhelder, Gerald Noelting, Lois B. Murphy, Hans Thomae	247
XIV.	A Socio-Psychological Investigation of Suicide Edwin S. Shneidman and Norman L. Farberow	270
XV.	Problems of Measurement in Objective Personality Evaluation J. C. Brengelmann	294
XVI.	Brief Projective Methods in Personality Assessment Henry P. David and William Rabinowitz	316
XVII.	Research in Personality Assessment: A Commentary Richard Meili	342
XVIII.	Beyond Provincialism: A Note on the International Congress Joseph Nuttin	<i>35</i> 8
	Index	365

PART ONE Overview

I Historical Trends in Personality Research

INTRODUCTION

SCIENCE-MAKING relevant to a better understanding of human states, activities, and achievements is proceeding in different languages and terminologies at widely-separated places in both hemispheres at such a healthy rate and in such multifarious ways and directions that no single array of papers of the sort that we have here could possibly be representative of all its diversities of being and becoming; nor could any psychologist keep abreast of it on all fronts without abandoning his own researches. Allow me, then, to start with a disclaimer of the Olympian connotations of the assigned heading, "Overview," as well as of the above title for my prelude to this second triennial concert of eminent performers.

After re-reading Gordon Allport's knowledgeable overview of the preceding (first) volume of Perspectives, my tentative conclusion was that he had already said well as much as I could say about trends in the sphere of personology, as much as could reasonably be said without a far more analytical, comprehensive, and chronological survey of the field. Indeed, he had succeeded, it seemed to me, in writing an excellent preface to both Perspectives. What was left? It is true that Allport's focus of attention was theoretical trends, rather than research trends, in Europe and America; but, since research and theory, at their best, are functionally intermeshed, each being both the

determinant and consequence of the other, Allport's review necessarily took note of the main currents of investigation as they are ordinarily defined and named today. It is also true that Allport chose to emphasize contrasts of orientation—especially between Germany and the United States—rather than similarities and convergences; but, in so doing, he omitted very little that is pertinent to our topic. In short, he competently covered a good deal of the ground that otherwise would have fallen to my lot, and the reader of this second volume should therefore have the advantage of a brief summary as reminder of his chief points.

SUMMARY OF ALLPORT'S DISTINGUISHING MARKS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN AND CONTINENTAL THEORIES

Allport's first conclusion, supported by the judgment of several other contributors to the first volume, was that the preoccupations of theorists in Great Britain and in the United States have been more similar than dissimilar. "The same kind of theories—psychoanalytic, factorial, positivistic, projective, and interpersonal—prevail in the two countries." But when he compared these shared Anglo-American trends to those which were most conspicuous on the Continent, dissimilarities became more apparent than similarities. "With some trepidation"—yet, in my scales, with considerable acumen—Allport proposed the following "distinguishing marks of Anglo-American and Continental theories respectively":

Philosophical assumptions: The Lockean tradition is dominant in England and America; the Leibnitzian and Kantian on the Continent. Anglo-American theorists are more apt to conceive of personalities as reactive (rather than internally aroused and proactive) and also as readily modified by environmental influences (rather than as basically and enduringly structured by genetical determinants).

The wnole and its parts: Holistic (global, synthetic) conceptions, with fewer differentiations of various components of personality, are more prevalent on the Continent. Typology, existential psychology, and Verstehen psychology are cited as illustrations of this outlook.

Points of view: There is less meliorism and optimism, more fatalism and pessimism on the Continent.

Social interaction: There is less attention to the formulation of interpersonal transactions on the Continent.

Brain models: Anglo-American psychologists are currently more interested in theoretical models derived from neurophysiology and cybernetics, as well as in physiological determinants generally.

Methodology and creativity: A far greater attachment to positivistic tenets, both in thought and practice, is characteristic of British and American psychologists. In the judgment of theorists of this persuasion, some of the dominant trends on the Continent-phenomenology, existential psychology, stratification theory-yield little that is clearly communicable, precise, and susceptible of verification. And yet there is the undeniable fact that Europe has been the breeding ground of all, or almost all, fundamentally new and important ideas. Besides the allpervasive influence of Freud, Allport mentions the typologies of Jung, Kretchmer and Spranger, the psychometric and psychodiagnostic methods of Binet, Jung, and Rorschach, the formative labors of the Würzburg school as basis for studies of attitudes, Lewin as generator of various lines of theory and research, the philosophy of existentialism, the pioneering work of Janet, Pavlov, Stern, Adler, and Piaget. (To this list of originators, some of us might be inclined to add the names of Köhler, Wertheimer, Koffka, and Goldstein; the Bühlers, Luria, Werner, and Mareno; Melanie Klein, Rank, Alexander, Horney, Fromm, Else Frankel-Brunswik, and Erikson; Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Pareto; Boas, Malinowski, and Sapir; Bergson, Heidegger, Carnap, and many more. Among great British sources of ideas and methods, there is Darwin, of course, and Tyler, Fraser, Sherrington, McDougall, Galton, Karl Pearson, Spearman, Fisher, and a host of others.) "Where would we be without them?"

COMMENTARY

Although pure positivism seems to be dying of inanition, positivistic measures of scientific worth—as best exemplified in

physics—are assuredly accorded a far higher status in the value systems of many British and American psychologists than they are in the value systems of our Continental colleagues, and I agree with Allport that the consequences of these two contrasting estimates constitute the clearest difference between the nature of their respective contributions. The picture in the United States is not clear-cut, because so many European "ideamen" have emigrated to this country and leavened in diverse ways the course of psychological thought and action. What America has done is to provide congenial pots for the melting, marriage, and systematic integration of the transported ideas, as well as the necessary technical resources, inventiveness, and ingenuity for the testing, correction, and revision of these ideas according to increasingly rigorous criteria.

This positivistic trend was initiated, in large measure, by the ideal formula, created in the mind of Paylov and established by his experiments, which was seized by that persuasive, onetracked, charismatic, timely publicist, James B. Watson, labeled "behaviorism," and sold to all but a few American psychologists as the only model on which to build a veritable science. With this sword he murdered, on his right hand, the meandering introspectionism of Titchener, and, on his left, the nativistic drive theory of McDougall; and ever since that triumph, Watsonian behaviorism has constituted the fixed image of American psychology-shallow, mechanistic, Philistine, soulless-in the minds of a large number of Continental, including Soviet, thinkers. Although Watson failed to stem the tide of Freudian ideas and although, in due course, the method of introspectionism and the concept of purposive disposition were each (with a new look) officially resurrected, so indelible has proved the imprint of Watson's message that even today Americans must honor him with a semantic gesture by speaking of the "behavioral sciences," although "behavior" now embraces everything that Watson excluded from the realm of science, everything, in fact, that can be studied.

After the definite separation of psychology from academic departments of traditional philosophy—a strategic turning-point—a number of veteran experimentalists raised their sights

from biology and physiology toward the far more perfected physical sciences with their mathematics, symbolic logic, operational definitions, systems of postulates and theorems; and nowadays it is the mounting ambition of these theorists to build, so far as possible, a psychology in the image of physics. Since the advance toward this ideal is facilitated by studying the most consistent organisms in stable, rigidly-constrained situations, psychologists with this extravagant ambition have (with certain recent exceptions) almost invariably restricted their fields of concern to the behavior of lower organisms or to the simplest perceptual or physiological processes of human beings. Although thereby divorcing themselves, strictly speaking, from the sphere of personology, these experimentalists have been notably influential, first, by providing the general outlines of a sophisticated learning theory, and second, by holding up their scientific standards which, though forever unattainable by anyone who is genuinely interested in human nature, nevertheless induce the personologist to work toward more explicit and verifiable propositions, greater numbers of subjects, more rigidly controlled experiments, instrumental recordings, and the mechanical and statistical manipulation of his data. The general effect of this ideal has been to put excellence of means (and scientific prestige) ahead of importance of ends (significance of obtained knowledge). To this twist may be ascribed, in part, the technical fecundity but conceptual parasitism of American psychology.

I would guess that this popular, militant, philosophical, positivistic, behavioristic movement is enough to account for all of Allport's above-listed characteristics of American trends (exemplified to a less extent by British trends). With this ultrascientific orientation and with Pavlov as grandfather figure, the activist American psychologist—an empirical, inductive, thinking extravert, in contrast, say, to the more numerous rationalistic, deductive, thinking introverts of Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland—is predisposed toward controlled experimentation and hence to initiate action himself by stimulating his subjects (animal or human) and thereby making them reactors (rather than proactors). Following Pavlov, one of the more frequent aims of an American psychologist will be to discover how to

change or condition (train or socialize) the reactions of his subjects by rewards and punishments, and hence he necessarily will stress modifiability through environmental influences, even though he may end as Pavlov did, by discriminating different constitutional types of subjects. Since it is not possible to elicit and record more than a very few parts of a subject's personality in any one session or in any series of sessions of the same kind, an experimentalist will rarely, if ever, obtain enough data to justify his speaking of a "whole personality" in any meaningful sense. The study of social interactions is merely an extension of the experimental method to include human beings as stimuli, instead of restricting psychology to knowledge about responses to physical things or to written words and pictures. From physics was derived the hope of constructing integrated theoretical systems such as Hull's and topological field theories such as Lewin's, and, more recently, theoretical models based on cybernetics and information theory.

This covers in a rough way Allport's chief classes of distinctive marks of Anglo-American theories as compared to Continental theories. No doubt some burden of determination must be assigned to temperamental and characterological differences. British and American psychologists, let us say, are more apt to be extraceptors, starting from what they see on the periphery, and either staying there or working in; whereas many Continental (though relatively few Norwegian and French) psychologists are intraceptors, starting from what they feel and think, and either staying there or working out. The difference may also be connected with the fact that traditional philosophy and psychology have not been so sharply divided on the Continent, and students who elect the latter are more likely to be part-philosophers than part-biologists. There is relatively little animal experimentation, Pavlovian psychology, or statistical confirmation of propositions in Germany; the greater emphasis is on the rational evaluations, aspirations, subjective experiences, and basic styles of superior men or at least of mature and educated persons in their more conscious, exalted or despairing, moments.

The Verstehen school of psychology, for example, assumes the possibility of an intuitive grasp of "events as fraught with

significance in relation to a totality" (Allport quoting Spranger); and there is no doubt that many people have intuitive experiences of this nature. But the question is, to what extent they are delusory. Have a number of Verstehen psychologists, as well as psychologists of other persuasions, independently observed, or been presented with a report of, the same series of events in which a given subject participated, and have they all "grasped" them in the same way and apperceived them as "fraught" with the same "significance" in relation to the same "totality"? If so, we can speak of high inter-judge reliability and declare that, according to this criterion, we have something public and objective which belongs in the domain of science. But, if not, then each apperception is private and must be understood partially in terms of the personality of the apperceptor. This, however, calls for another group of apperceptors, and so on in an infinite regression. Here, following Allport, I have been thinking back three or four decades to an earlier Germany, the birthplace of academic psychology. My comments are not at all applicable or less applicable to the Soviet Union, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, France, and Switzerland.

Having chosen to identify differences of trends, rather than dominant trends, in Europe and America, Allport necessarily called attention to what was unique, distinctive, or exceptional in each country. As already noted, for example, what stands out in the United States-like the head of an acromegalic-are the theories and objective standards of experimental animal psychologists who have denounced reports of subjective processes simply because the entities they study do not speak a language they can understand. With this as reference point, what stands out on the Continent, then, is its polar opposite, existential psychology, developed by those who are more interested in the interior environments and experiences of human beings than they are in the muscular responses of lower organisms. Here one is comparing Continental personologists to American biologists rather than to American personologists. Furthermore, by stressing in this way the more striking contrasts and minimizing the similarities, one is likely to disregard preoccupations flourishing on both sides of the Atlantic and end with a somewhat

misleading picture. As Allport pointed out, there are numerous exceptions and overlaps among the differences he enumerated.

We grant that all psychology in the United States has been influenced to some extent by the standards of positivism, and that behavioristic learning theory, in one form or another, is an integral part of most developmental personality theories; but this is nowhere near the whole story in the sphere of personology. The widespread use of paper-and-pencil tests, questionnaires, and inventories, supplemented by factor analysis, is a rather distinctive Anglo-American occupation, which can only pretend to be positivistic. Psychoanalytic theory, which is far more comprehensive and pervasive than either of these two concerns in both England and the United States, includes minute explorations of interior states and processes, via projective tests or more directly in interviews. Field theory is also prevalent in the two countries; and last, but certainly not least, are role theory, social systems theory, and culture theory. All these may be relatively more favored in Great Britain and the United States; but they are also found pretty nearly everywhere in Europe, in the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Switzerland, France, and Belgium, witness the fertile Ombredane and the accomplished personality theorist, Nuttin.

DIFFICULTIES IN PLACING AND CLASSIFYING TRENDS

Do we estimate the strength of a certain trend in each country by the absolute number or by the percentage of psychologists who sustain it? In the United States there is more of almost everything because there are many more psychologists. In twenty years the existential psychologists in this country may outnumber those in Europe. Again, do we use as our criterion the country of origin or the country where the trend is most widely supported? Roughly speaking, all trends have originated in Europe, and yet all trends (with a few exceptions) are more widely supported in the United States. The conception of "personality-as-a-whole" is properly attributed by Allport to the Continent; but since the emigration to this country of the leading Gestalt psychologists of Germany, the publication of the

holistic conceptions of the biologists, Ritter and Childs in America and E. S. Russell in England, and the derivation of systems theory from the more developed sciences, the whole-part concept has been taken for granted in the United States and has been more elaborately developed here than it appears to have been in Europe.

And then, what shall we say about psychoanalytic theory, which Allport includes as one of the shared Anglo-American currents, but not as one which distinguishes them from those on the Continent? Psychoanalysis is a medical psychology that is entirely Continental in origin; but yet it has not permeated university circles on the Continent, or even in England, to the extent that it has in the United States. In this country, I would say, it is the most popular theory in the field of personality, inspiring and shaping a multiplicity of productive researches. If we omit it as a characteristic of personological developments in England and America because it had its genesis in Austria or because it is also prevalent in several European countries, we may be leaving out the hero of the drama. On the other hand, if we include it as a dominant influence, it is harder to hold to the proposition that Anglo-American theories do not give sufficient weight to constitutional factors (e.g. stages of psychosexual development), to basic character structure (e.g. constellation of infantile complexes), to stratifications of the personality (e.g. id, ego, superego), or to internally generated activity (e.g. libido, wish).

The biggest obstacle, however, to a revealing discussion of scientific inclinations is the names that have been given to them. It was said above, for example, that British and American psychologists have been concerned with the "same kind of theories—psychoanalytic, factorial, positivistic, projective, and interpersonal." Now, psychoanalysis is a complex theoretical system which is intended for representations (both differentiated and integrated) of "entire" personalities. Projective tests, on the other hand, are techniques for obtaining imaginations, imaginations which are open to interpretation in the light of any theory. Factor analysis is a method of processing data, the result of which may be used in various ways with the minimum of the-

oretical assumptions. Positivism is a scientific philosophy which is largely concerned with rules and procedure and criteria of meaning and validity. "Interpersonal" refers to events in which the chief participants are human, events which are susceptible of formulation and interpretation in terms of any adequate theory of personality. One finds comparable medleys and confusions of terms pretty nearly everywhere: different kinds of things classed together, different words for the same kind of thing, and over and over again the name of a theory or movement which combines diverse components, some of which are integral to theories or movements with other names.

How, for example, shall we deal with the copious, variable, still-evolving phenomenological-existential movement in Europe? It seems to incorporate a general assumption relative to the participation, even in the most "objective" observations, of the scientist's unconscious mental sets and suppositions, an assumption which is shared by physicists as well as by a large number of psychologists. And, then, existential phenomenologists appear to be particularly concerned with regions and modes of investigation (e.g. covert psychic experiences as much as overt acts, total experiences rather than isolated parts of experiences, stages of processes as much as their final products, qualities as much as quantities, etc.) which are also stressed by quite a few psychologists who are nominally affiliated with other movements or who do not choose to think and work within the confines of any single creed. Take, say, the following three, often-quoted existential principles: first, that one must not abstract the person from his world; second, that every person apperceives and feels his world in a way that is unique-though similar, in certain respects, to the ways of other persons of the same type; and third, that the psychologist by various means (assisted by the process of empathic identification) must attempt to apperceive each subject's world as the subject does himself. These principles are basic to the concept of "beta situation" as I have defined it, and of the "behavioral environment" as defined by Koffka and Lewin, and basic to the rationale of numerous projection tests, such as Van Lennep's, as well as to an understanding of the "transference situation" in psychoanalysis. But besides these and

other significant counter-positivistic, counter-introspectionistic (in the old sense), and counter-rationalistic orientations and principles, existential psychology seems to focus very largely on a doctrine (only one of several applicable diagnoses) relative to the plight of modern men: men estranged from faith, love, and the regnant values of their society, victims of a profound, essential anxiety, men desperately facing death and nothingness. Must a psychologist limit himself to one or two sources of widespread distress?

One difficulty, especially for an American psychologist, is that this important, infectious existential movement has come out of a complex of philosophies from which it has borrowed unfamiliar terms and expressions, and one suspects at times that, like mysticism, it is necessarily outside the furthest extensions of science, however defined, and that what it knows is essentially incommunicable, except possibly through poetry, art, or religious symbolism. Here, of course, I am merely exposing the ignorance and blockheadedness which, in this special sphere of thought, Continentals rather ascribe to English-speaking philosophers and psychologists. As van Kaam has pointed out, Buytendijk has his Dutch publications translated into French and German, but not into English. What I have said about phenomenology and existential psychology, however, applies to every composite of diverse elements which has been given a name. Once named, it achieves identity as a trend, and we soon find ourselves coping with a galaxy of names, rising and declining in popularity, signifying different sorts of things-much, little, or practically nothing. Trends that are not named are not likely to be mentioned.

WOULD WE BENEFIT BY KNOWLEDGE OF THE MAGNITUDE OF TRENDS?

The title of this chapter suggests that my assignment calls, first, for a discrimination of different scientific movements such as those that I have listed (in conformity with Allport though with more emphasis on research); second, for a rough annual estimate of mass, say of the number of publications exemplifying

each movement in each successive year since its inception or since some arbitrarily selected date; and third, for a figure, based on these data, indicating the rate of expansion or contraction of each trend through time. Readers of this volume might reasonably expect this much of a social scientist, especially if they did not look too closely at the difficulty of properly classifying trends and the labor of counting the scientific works which manifest and sustain each of the defined classes. I once expected this much of myself, but I was eventually deterred from the endeavor, partly by the difficulty and the labor of doing a really thorough job in the way I judged it should be done, and partly—if I were to settle for less than this—by Montaigne's crucial question, *cui bono*?

By reading, traveling, and attending meetings most of us have a general impression of past and present currents of psychological interest and productivity; and if this impression is felt to be too fuzzy there are numerous masterly articles in the literature—especially for Americans in each excellent *Annual Review of Psychology*—which will do away with some of the vagueness of our knowledge. Is anything valuable to be gained by making our impressions more precise? Might not mere estimates (without evaluations) of quantities of work prove more misleading than instructive? Indeed, might not increased publicity as to which bandwagons are leading the procession do more harm than good?

In this fashion I rationalized myself out of the difficulties of constructing a comprehensive classification of trends and out of the toil of counting their supporters. It seemed that on the majority of us the effect, if any, of learning that there is a rising movement among our colleagues in a certain scientific direction would be to incline us toward that direction. Joining this trend, we would be likely to enjoy a greater amount of companionship, mutual aid and stimulation, intellectual and economic security, and, to boot, professional recognition in the nearer future. If this gregarious disposition, this dependent need for acceptance and social identity—so prevalent in the United States—is veritably one of the impediments to fundamental, radical creativity, should it be stimulated more than it is already? Contrariwise, on

a certain number of us—those who must be different or unique at all costs, who would rather be wrong alone, or with a few choice spirits, than right with the confident and vociferous majority—on these the effect, if any, of definite information regarding dominant concerns would be to bend them in the opposite direction, to end, possibly, in some isolated *cul-de-sac*.

What I am suggesting is that every psychologist probably knows as much about the magnitude of different current interests as is good for the best health of his own researches; which, please note, is very different from saying that he knows all he needs to know about the current investigations of his colleagues. The report of an experiment which may be of signal relevance to his own work may be either one of numerous representatives of a massive, on-going movement, such as developmental studies, in which it will merely add one to the tally for that trend, or it will not be counted at all, because the trend it represents (say, reactions to sensory deprivation) is either unique or exemplified by too few publications to be included in any general survey. Anyhow, whether included or not included, there will be no mention of the significant details of the experiment. And then, is it not the new and promising direction that is illustrated by a lone experimenter which should be heralded? By the time its current has gathered momentum and become a sizable river of cognitive energy, it will be obvious to everyone, and its fountainhead may already have started to dry up, a fact which the figures will obscure. We psychologists, like other mortals, have our fixations and vested interests in trends, departure from which is not easy, and we are not immune from the tendency to redouble our efforts, as Santayana put it, when we have lost sight of our aim, or when our aim has become trivial. Here, the commonplace point which democrats and social scientists on both sides of the Atlantic are conditioned to overlook is that a large quantity, even an increasing quantity, of research is no guaranty of quality or ultimate importance. A mountain of scientific work may give forth, with much labor, what on close inspection proves to be nothing but a mouse.

In contrast to all these considerations, however, I would like to suggest that if we had a comprehensive and fitting classifica-

tion of elementary trends, and were able to trace their evolutions and inter-marriages over a sufficient number of years, including tentative, retrospective evaluation of their several contributions to the science of human nature—if we were capable of this, not only would the above-mentioned possibility of hindering contemporary developments be eliminated, but we would learn more than we know now about how creativity has operated in our discipline down the years, and we might envisage better paths ahead of us in the future. We would find that a movement which declines and falls may rise again with renewed vigor in combination with some other movement, and we might also see which veins of thought are near exhaustion and what possibilities have yet to be explored.

What I am proposing here is an extensive, analytic and synthetic history of the career of basic ideas relevant to our understanding of personality, a book to be written in the future by somebody, not myself, with sufficient competence and energy. Since the author of this hypothetical book is an unknown, I shall call him X. Eventually, I suspect, there will be an actual X who will be wise enough to discard almost everything that I have to say in the next section. For the time being, however, X is a purely imaginary person who, though ideal in certain ways, necessarily suffers from some of the prejudices and limitations of his maker.

PROLEGOMENON FOR A HISTORY OF TRENDS

The trends exemplified by the work of every psychologist are, in certain general respects, like those exemplified by *all* other psychologists; and, in certain less general respects, like those exemplified by *some* other psychologists (of this or that class—nation, school, or specialty); and, in certain particular respects, like those exemplified by *no* other psychologist.

All of us, I assume, are trying in one way or another to add to the common fund of relatively valid knowledge as to the manifestations in environments of human nature (of all human natures, of some similar human natures, or of unique

human natures), and/or to perfect modes of eliciting, recording, ordering, and understanding these manifestations in situations. Or, to put it another way, there is one notable, massive trend of thought, action, observation, and evaluation toward the construction of a better theoretical system of concepts and propositions, in terms of which the subjective and objective manifestations of psychic events may be analytically and synthetically observed, recorded, formulated, explained, predicted (under specified conditions), and, if possible, produced (within specified limits under specified conditions). Although this *ultima Thule* of the science of human nature must be placed beyond the ever-receding horizon of a questionable future, it is the target, nonetheless, of countless approximating efforts.

But since, as we all realize, personality is an exceedingly complex, continuing, yet changing, system of manifold partsystems and sub-systems operating from birth to death in diverse, successive situations with diverse outcomes and consequences, no single psychologist or small group of psychologists would even dream of studying all parts of all types of personalities under all kinds of circumstances at all ages. Inevitably we find a large variety of trends which may be grossly differentiated in terms of 1) class of events studied (regional trend), that is, differentiated in terms of which aspect or aspects (states, functions, achievements) of personality are being studied, separately or interdependently, in relation to which class or classes of entities or situations. We find trends which may be differentiated in terms of 2) class of subjects studied (population trend), that is, in terms of subjects of which race, age, sex, society, status, vocation, etc., or subjects with what degree of health, wealth, knowledge, or ability, or with what pathological diagnosis, or belonging to what somatic or psychological type, are being studied, separately or comparatively.

Since most, if not all, psychologists, in their observations, speculations, experimental designs, and manipulations, are guided, implicitly or explicitly, by one or another theoretical construct, assumption, or hypothesis, each of them is likely to contribute—by way of illustration, validation or invalidation, reconstruction, or creation—to one of a third class of trends:

3) class of concepts, theories, or theoretical systems tested or developed (theoretical trend), that is, a trend which is defined in terms of what kind of already proposed concept, postulate, or model is being tested, corrected, or revised, or what kind of new variable, perceptible or hypothetical, has been distinguished, defined, and classified, or what type of new proposition has been stated, or what kind of new combination or new system of variables and propositions has been constructed. Another major division of interests would surely be 4) class of techniques used or developed (technical trend). What kind of means does the psychologist employ to obtain the information he is seeking? What procedure does he design? What type of test or instrument does he invent or improve? And then, 5) class of data-organizing methods used or developed (data-ordering trend): the psychologist may present a simple, chronological account of what he has seen or heard, or he may classify, count, tabulate, represent on a graph, correlate statistically, or factor-analyze his data in one or another way. Last, but more fundamental than any of these divisions, would be trends classified in terms of 6) class of basic (philosophical) assumptions or evaluations exemplified (basic assumption trend) by a psychologist's theories or researches.

I surmise that our ideal, mythic author, X, will distinguish large categories of this sort, though his divisions may be somewhat different, and his classes will certainly be more fully and explicitly defined. In all likelihood he will want to add another category, 7) class of final intentions (intention trend), in order to distinguish-besides knowledge for its own sake-various kinds of applications of this knowledge, such as diagnosis, therapy, selection of personnel, vocational guidance, education, and so forth. The highly articulate X will come out with better names for some of these categories. "Regional trend" and "population trend," as used here, may confuse some readers. "Region" points to the psychologist's field (area, domain) of observation and reflection, commonly consisting of a subject in a specified environment manifesting certain kinds of states and activities (e.g. needs, perceptions, locomotions, manipulations, etc.). "Population," in this context, means nature of population of subjects

studied (e.g. children, Polynesians, endomorphs, schizophrenics, etc.).

The perspicacious X will point out, with unexcelled clarity, how a single experimenter could advance seven classes of trends at once. For instance, he might increase our knowledge of the imagination (class 1, regional trend) as well as of the personalities of primitive peoples (class 2, population trend) by comparing the styles and products of story-composing processes of whites and Negroes in the Belgian Congo. In this investigation he might use a special type of "imaginal eductor" that he invented and record the subjects' spontaneous responses on tape (class 4, technical trends). He might employ a phenomenological frame of reference in discriminating styles of composition and several modified Jungian concepts in dealing with the thematic content (class 3, theoretical trends). Returning to his laboratory, he might use a computing machine to intercorrelate his protocol variables (class 5, data-ordering trend), and discover that a certain combination of these variables was a sufficiently valid indicator of good adjustment to white standards, and hence could be of service to personnel selection agencies (class 7, intention trend). I shall let you decide which philosophical position (class 6) is indicated by these labors.

The discerning X will also demonstrate lucidly, with numerous apt illustrations, the interdependence of these major trend categories: how technique is determined in part by the selected region of concern (processes to be studied) and in part by the hypothesis to be tested, and vice versa; how a certain theory may determine what population is chosen for investigation, and how the evaluation of the findings of an investigation may result in a revision of the initial theory; and how everything is largely dependent on the final intention of the psychologist, whether it be pure knowledge, therapy, or propaganda. We shall be shown, for example, that the adoption of a strict, positivistic position (trend 6), will exclude the study of free verbal expressions (trend 1)-since so many of these are susceptible to critically-different interpretations-and will thereby limit the scope of theory (trend 3) and the range of permitted techniques (trend 4). All of this, of course, is common knowledge. But

there are unrecorded, instructive details in the history of the mental interactions between assumptions, intentions, theories, regions, populations, and techniques, which X will not fail to describe in a way that will be helpful to his colleagues.

Of comparable interest should be X's revealing story of the temporal procession of studied regions, designed techniques, and formulated theories. Here, instead of the mutual influence of different classes of trends (e.g. regions, techniques, theories, etc.), the topic will be the dependence of each novel scientific achievement on preceding achievements of the same class. A new psychological theory, for example, may be derived by analogy from physics, chemistry, or biology. From these sciences have come concepts such as that of energy, force, vector, affinity, attraction and repulsion, positive and negative valence, field, region, boundary, system, level, organism and environment, part-whole, selfpreservative, herd-preservative, and race-preservative instincts, structure and function, differentiation and integration, hierarchical organization, dynamic equilibrium, homeostasis, adjustment, competition, survival of the fittest, evolution, law of entropy, open system, and so forth. See MacLeod's illuminating comments in this volume on Newtonian (physical) structuralism and Aristotelian (biological) functionalism in psychology. Other concepts and theories have come as explicit, abstract formulations, either of common sense (implicit theories) or of aphorisms (the wisdom of the ages), or of new facts discovered through diffuse explorations or focused experiments, or of signal experiences in which the psychologist himself was emotionally involved (e.g. Freud's self-analysis). Further concepts and theories have been the resultant of a generalization, extension, differentiation, or modification of an existing psychological theory, of an opposition to some existing theory, or of a synthesis of two or more theories. In addition to such sources and modes of theoretical composition, the all-embracing X will surely take account of their principal culturological, sociological, and personological determinants (e.g. the influence of Marxism, of capitalism, of war, of social disintegration, of the psychologist's temperament or his imbedded values). And X will deal, in a like manner, with the history of instruments and methods, of

regions and populations studied, of basic assumptions and avowed intentions.

Of one thing we can be reasonably certain: The astute X will not often be confused by names-names for philosophical positions, concepts, theories, techniques, schools of psychology, and so forth. He will not assume, for example, that entities with different names are necessarily different, or that entities with the same names are similar, or that the nature of an entity (object, process, relation, theory, method) corresponds to the dictionary meaning of the word by which it is denoted. He will not take for granted, let us say, either that a so-called "projective test" is actually a test (of anything that can be specified before the administration of this procedure), or that the responses it educes are, for the most part, actual projections (according to any dynamic definition of this word). Furthermore, X will rarely see fit to traffic with unspecified terms (e.g. interview, as a method) or terms which refer to complex wholes (e.g. psychoanalysis, as theory). He will almost invariably analyze the objects of his discourse into their component parts, qualities, properties. He will realize, say, that there are several essentially different sorts of interviews as well as different classes of interviewers, and also realize that psychoanalysis is a more or less integrated system of numerous component concepts and theories, some of which are low or declining, and some of which are high or rising in the estimation of psychologists. In short, X's ambitious endeavor will be to identify the basic, elementary ideas involved in each class of trends (regional, theoretical, technical, etc.), to show how these have been combined, separated, and re-combined historically, and then to point to possible promising combinations which have yet to be explored.

REGIONAL TRENDS

I imagine that before starting his exposition of regional trends, the systematic X will first, for his own guidance, distinguish (a) every analytically-separable psychological state (e.g. sleep, state of anxiety, state of want), and process (e.g.

explanation, evaluation, actional decision, exposition, locomotion, donation) which has been or might be studied, and then list (b) every association of these variables whose mutual relationships have been or might be demonstrated (e.g. state of hunger and perception, state of mental fatigue and memory, activated need achievement and story composition). Next, with such variables and relationships in mind, X may be disposed to construct (c) a classification of external situations (in terms, say, of touch, sight, sound, or sight and sound, of discrete sensations, of words and sentences, of objects or composites, inanimate or animate, actual or represented, pictured, stationary or moving, mute, sounding, or speaking, of contrivedartificial or realistic-or "real" occasions from which the subject remains detached as a mere witness or in which he is involved as a participating actor and/or observer, and so forth). After this, I would suppose, X will list (d) the different, possible combinations, tried and untried, of the various, defined psychological states and processes, on the one hand, and the classes of confronting situations, on the other (e.g. interpretation of an actual, stationary, symbolic object or of the representation of a person's path of locomotion, explanation of a person's reaction to a situation as described in tape-recorded sentences, emotional reactions to a contrived, mechanically-produced, stressful situation, verbal reactions to criticism in a contrived, realistic, dyad discussion). Finally (to be used when relevant), X will distinguish (e) different kinds and degrees of immediate effects or outcomes of such activities (e.g. degrees of success or failure, kinds of error or distortion) and of later consequences of these activities and effects (e.g. degrees of positive or negative evaluation by others, depression or elation, gain or loss of confidence, better or worse performance, learning).

Drawing from his immense cranial library of knowledge, X will trace the history of these trends in academic and medical psychology, recording the emergence of successive regions of concern, starting with sensation, perception, memory, and other elementary cognitive processes. This first phase was largely guided by a philosophical orientation, concerned with questions such as, what can we know about the external world? and by

what means? and with what degree of certainty? Some supposed that at best, the mind was analogous to a photographic plate, free from modifying dispositions, either acquired or innate. The next distinct phase, coming out of an indifference to, if not utter contempt for, traditional philosophical problems and speculations, consisted of an attempt to elevate the status of psychology by reducing it to the conceptual level of biology or physiology. Here the successive regions of attention were: overt physiological (glandular, emotional-autonomic, and effectivemuscular) reactions to controlled stimulation, conditioned reflexes, and means-end motor learning resulting from hunger, sex, and other drives. Both of these major regional trends were personologically peripheral and superficial. It was French, and later Austrian, medical psychology-oriented by the wish to discover the hidden determinants of neurotic illness-which provided the depth dimension for an adequate theory of personality. A new set of cathected regions emerged from these labors: the phenomena of hypnotism, unconscious psychic processes, underlying compelling emotions and needs (anxiety, love, hate, sex, need for superiority and prestige), dreams, fantasies, wordassociations, and defense mechanisms. Contemporary with this large aggregate of concerns was an expanding measurement and assessment trend, the successive regions being: general mental intelligence, special aptitudes and abilities, avowals of interests and of cultural evaluations (sentiments, attitudes), and selfestimates pertinent to various personality traits, including needful dispositions.

The history of these developments, being well-known to psychologists, will be covered in a short space, even counting X's penetrating discussion of the probable determinants of choice of each new region of investigation. Less elementary will be X's account of subsequent studies of the mutual dependence of certain dispositional states and certain mental products: of needs, evaluations, and emotions, for instance, as determinants of word-associations, perceptions, apperceptions (inferences), and story compositions, as well as of different cognitions and beliefs as determinants of emotions and evaluations. The operation of a counteractive endopsychic need (denial) in influencing fantasy

productions is beautifully demonstrated in Miller's first-rate chapter. The effect or lack of effect on (a) the emotional reactivity of subjects to the highly-charged topic of death, of (b) an avowed, relevant, religious belief (e.g. immortality) constitutes the region of the well-controlled investigation by Alexander and Adlerstein. All substantial researches of this sort contribute to the great task of formulating the interdependence of various variables and sub-systems of personality.

Full of suggestiveness, I suspect, will be X's chronicle of the different, progressively-more-complicated combinations of (a) psychological processes and (b) confronting situations: First, say, studies of visual perceptions of the qualities of stationary, inanimate objects; then of moving pictures of expressive human beings in action; and, finally, studies of visual and auditory perceptions (inferences, interpretations, explanations, predictions) of sound films of conversing persons, as well as of persons in the flesh with whom the experimental subjects have interacted. Here surely are evidences of trends of change from static configurations in space to dynamic patterns in time as regions for experimentation, and from sheer visual perceptions to complex apperceptions based on both visual and auditory cues, from artificial to realistic situations, and from detached to involved subjects. Comparable trends of change will become apparent when X reviews the story of memory research, reaching from memories of discrete, printed, nonsense syllables to memories of stressful conversations in which the subject himself participated. Both of these topics-perception and memory-will be discussed later in connection with an appropriately large section of this volume dealing with "person perception."

The book of our ideal author, X, will be especially interesting, I would guess, when he starts pointing to emergent regions of investigation and regions which are still awaiting the invasion of a venturous explorer. I am not in a position to say what these will be. But as illustration of an emergent region we have the unforeseen phenomena, associated with the perception, recognition, and reproduction of figures, as revealed by the delicate and ingenious techniques of Brengelmann (e.g. stages in the actual-genetic process of perception, as well as other extremely significant

micro-analyses of relatively simple functions). As another illustration of an emergent region, Î might call attention to Luria's brilliant study of the maturation of the capacity for deliberate. voluntary movements, more particularly his report of the differential effects in a young child (a) of being told to make a specific movement at a given signal and (b) of telling himself to make this movement. Piaget started a great trend of longitudinal researches in the regions of perception and cognition in young children, a trend which is represented in this volume by Inhelder's and Noelting's short discussion of experiments to reveal successive stages of reasoning ability in children. But only Soviet psychologists, so far as I know, have performed multifarious, comparable studies in the region of conscious planning, initiation, and control of effective muscular and social actions. Not related to these, we have Lois Murphy's long series of investigations devoted to children's "coping methods and styles," all-too-briefly abstracted in this volume.

Among other regional trends which today are relatively new and promising X might mention studies of (a) various effects of sub-liminal stimulation, (b) reactions of various sorts of different kinds of stress, including sensory deprivation, (c) general dispositional sets (response sets) in experimental subjects, (d) phenomenology of various mental processes-perception, evaluation, description, explanation, prediction, fictional composition-with special emphasis on styles, or modes, of performance, (e) processes, ("defense mechanisms" and others) operating in the service of favorable evaluations of self by self and by others, (f) the interdependence of sthenic and asthenic emotions, apperceptions and evaluations of self and alter, occurring during and after participation in an argumentative dyadic or polyadic (small group) proceeding, (g) emotional and imaginal reactions to music. poetry, and other forms of art, (h) time-sense and time-perspective (past, present, and future), and feelings and conceptions relative to the passage of time and occurrence of death, (i) creativity, its component processes, its styles and products, the characteristics of creative personalities, et cetera, et cetera. Among several unexplored regions, X might possibly include the phenomenology and the determinants of ordination (planning),

one of the most universal and consequential of mental operations, though as yet scarcely mentioned in the textbooks, except occasionally in connection with the psychology of decision-making.

EXPERIMENTATION AND THE REGION OF PERSONALITY

So far my rambling comments have been confined pretty much to the fringe of personality research, concerning, for the most part, the kinds of events, or regions (different combinations of classes of external situations and classes of reactive processes, and classes of outcomes), that are studied by experimentalists. Here the psychologist's ideal target might be a general proposition which is applicable to almost all normal personalities within a given age range, an ideal that is not infrequently approximated when attention is restricted to associations among relatively simple psychophysiological processes (sensory, sensory-autonomic, sensory-motor, motor) in connection with relatively simple configurations or arrays of stimuli. But even in such elementary experiments and even with animals-as Pavlov and others have demonstrated-marked individual and typological differences are often found, which call for some intervening personological variable, compound of variables, or model. In personality research, the simplest hypothesis to be tested is not unlikely to be one which states that the reaction, let us say, to situation A will be R1 in personalities of class X1, and R2 (the exact opposite) in personalities of class X2. Although one test is often considered sufficient to distinguish personalities of the two classes (X1 and X2), the standards of less debonair and slapdash personologists are rarely met so easily. Anyhow, our consideration of experimental regions has brought us to the mysteries and riddles of personality, a huge, embracing region of part-regions, superregions and sub-regions.

Experiments are of course invaluable and necessary to the development of a science of human nature, but they yield, at best, relatively precise and reliable answers to definitely stated

questions. Yet if all personologists were to confine themselves to experimentation—each necessarily in one or in a few regions—no sufficiently comprehensive formulation of a single personality, and hence of a type of personality or of an abstract of most personalities, would ever be attained. Experimentation is almost inevitably limited by scientific standards, time, and circumstance to the observation and measurement of a few (rather than many), restricted (rather than unrestricted) reactions (rather than proactions) to a few (rather than many), artificial (rather than "real") situations, at a particular temporal point or over a single period (rather than at different points or over several successive periods) of a subject's on-going changing personality. And even when the experimenter sees fit to inquire about his subject's covert (imperceptible, inner) states and processes during the experiment, his data is almost inevitably limited to those aspects of the experience which the subject is both able to recall and willing to communicate. Experimentalists are apt to forget what varieties of "guinea-pig" roles may be adopted by their subjects and to what extent.

Besides devotion to experimentation, the marks of a serious, full-fledged personologist-if X agrees with me-are: (a) a sturdy interest in many different regions (part-systems) of personality, during (b) successive periods in the life-span (on the assumption that the history of the personality is the personality-a crosssection being a convenient, though often highly artificial, abstraction from temporal events), and, since personality changes through time, (c) a pre-occupation with transformations (progressive and regressive) of personality, and hence (d) the practice of obtaining detailed, chronological reports of numerous concrete events (illustrative of the operation of significant dispositions and abilities) in which the subject participated in the course of his past and recent life, and, since such reports are almost invariably vague and distorted, in one way or another, (e) the practice of exposing, by various procedures (e.g. questionnaires, aptitude and situational tests), numerous parts of the subject's current personality and comparing these findings with the autobiographical data, and also (f) an incessant interest in the repressed and concealed, yet operating, parts of

the personality, and hence (g) the practice of obtaining, by various indirect means (e.g. eliciting free-associations, fantasies, and story compositions), the processes and productions from which hypothetical inferences can be made relative to childhood and adolescent dispositions and events which the subject is unable or too reluctant to report, and, then, (h) the practice of conducting "open-ended" interviews, subtly guided towards certain apparently critical, yet ambiguous and baffling, areas of experiences revealed by the outlined procedures. In brief, a confirmed personologist is apt to be a glutton for multifarious, concrete facts, as detailed and precise as he can get them (usually more than he can use), since only from the chronology of "real" events, failures and successes, recurrent and exceptional (representative of the personality at its "best" and at its "worst") can one derive a sufficiently plausible reconstruction of the evolution of an adult personality.

In the above account of the "real," rather than the artificial, events of personological concern, I could not help mentioning assessment methods (technical trends)—interviewing, especially—being the only means of obtaining certain necessary kinds of information. Every person, for example, has had and continues to have a number of wholly or largely private and secret experiences—covert fantasies, hopes, aspirations, dreads, envies, hatreds, ignoble temptations, transgressions, humiliations, sexual practices, and so forth—knowledge of which may provide the key to some of his otherwise inexplicable attitudes or actions; and there never will be any other way of acquiring actual facts (rather than hints and clues) about these veiled parts (not to speak of the repressed parts) of personality except through the avowals of the subject himself.

Consideration of this topic could bring us to the intriguing problems of so-called "person-perception," with the psychologist himself as chief "perceptor," deciding, from moment to moment, on the basis of his feelings and his inferences (derived from everything he sees and hears) what he should say next and how, and then correctly or incorrectly apperceiving the effects on the subject of what he has just said, et cetera. Viewed in this light, "person-perception" (considered in Part III of this volume) is

synonymous with personality assessment (considered in Part IV), except that the former is generally carried out without the use of instruments and the latter is sometimes carried out without even looking at the subject. I shall return to this matter later. It is mentioned here merely as a pointer to a possible, muchneeded, future technical trend (about which, with a little luck, X may have something to report), namely, the training of personologists themselves as instruments of precision, through participation in experiments in the perception and interpretation of other people's transient manifestations of psychic states, processes, and styles, including suppositions, or inferences, respecting the existence of established (recurrently active) dispositions or complexes, and including, possibly, explanations and predictions -not to speak of the perception and interpretation of the signs of somatotype, age, race, nationality, socio-economic status, vocation, knowledge, intelligence, special abilities, and so forth.

But to return to the important, generally inaccessible, secret experiences of subjects, it can be confidently predicted that the even-handed X will give due credit to the medical and clinical psychologists, especially the psychoanalysts, for devising gentle and unhurtful methods of exposure (technical trend). He will no doubt devote an ample chapter to a chronicle of their discoveries and another chapter to the writing of case-histories (theoretical and technical trends), indicating what regions must be explored by what available methods, and what criteria must be met before a formulation of a subject's personality can be considered satisfactory. Formulations presented by psychoanalysts are characteristically most illuminating, though almost inevitably onesided, because these are primarily devoted to representations of repressed determinants of neurotic illness and of mechanisms of defense, and because only couch and transference personalities are directly observable in the orthodox psychonalytical procedure. For a more balanced, comprehensive picture, other regions must be examined by appropriate techniques. Indeed, as I see it-and I pray that the fastidious X will agree with me on this point-only by comparing and evaluating the findings from a multiplicity of different methods can a team of personologists arrive at a sufficient degree of certainty respecting

those past experiences and those current dispositions and abilities upon which a plausible reconstruction of any personality must be founded.

So far as I can judge, present academic trends—determined partly by the high status of positivistic standards, partly by the current rage for little, neat experiments (at any cost), partly by existing requirements for a Ph.D. degree, and partly by lack of sufficient personnel, time, and cash—are indicative of an abandonment, in many quarters, of the endeavor to explore, measure, explain, and represent the various, interdependent component parts and systems of individual personalities, each as an on-going participant in various transactions with things, people, and ideas. I trust that by the time our awaited author X embarks on his momentous enterprise, this trend of change will be reversed, and there will be numerous, now unsuspected relations to be reported (theoretical trend).

No doubt, the so-called "longitudinal" way of studying personalities is ideal, starting in infancy with periodic observations of the subjects, combined with interrogations of the parents, continuing these examinations at less frequent intervals through childhood, and ending with follow-up assessments in later years to confirm or prove predictions made at different points in the course of infancy and childhood. A number of extended investigations of this type have been conducted in the past and some are still in progress. But for various reasons (Skard mentions several major difficulties) the trend of change seems to be moving toward more restricted programs of research. Illustrative of the best of these are the interesting investigations which several of the authors of the volume have conducted: notably Thomae in Germany, Lois Murphy in America, Inhelder and Noelting in Switzerland, Luria in the Soviet Union, and Skard in Norway, a fragment of each of which is outlined in the pages that lie ahead of you. In her Introduction and Commentary, Skard presents for our benefit some of the fruits of her long succession of intimate experiences with growing children and of the enlightened attempts to discriminate some of the determinants of change. Here I should not omit (though they are not summarized in this book) the illuminating, longitudinal experiments performed in Switzerland by Meili, author of the Commentary on Assessment. And, as so clearly shown in Shneidman and Farberow's chapter on suicide, it is equally important to consider socio-economic determinants of individual behavior.

This looks like the appropriate place for a few words about the tangled subject-matter of person perception, a department requiring a high degree of "snafu" tolerance, since the two designating terms-perception and empathy-have become incorrigible rovers, refusing to stay put. First, we were persuaded by Köhler and others that all of us are capable of "perceiving" and identifying feelings and emotions in another person, just as we perceive the movements of his facial muscles, despite the fact that we often disagree radically among ourselves and with the perceived subject about the former but not about the latter -bear me out in this, Mona Lisa-and the fact that an emotion can be feigned by a talented actor, if not by any one of us, and the fact that it is not possible to give an adequate operational definition (in terms of dependable, perceptible cues) of any feeling or emotion except a few in their fleeting moments of intensity. From "perceiving" emotions we progressed to the point where we could all "perceive" intentions, needs, and motives, oblivious of the years of sweat and sorrow psychologists have devoted to the seemingly simple enterprise of defining a motivation or even of demonstrating that "purpose" was a necessary and distinguishable concept for psychology. How gratifying it would be for positivists, what high inter-judge reliabilities we would get if we could all "perceive" a person's conscious intention registered on his forehead, and just below it his unconscious, underlying need! But the Napoleonic word "perception" could not be stopped at this border. It pushed on, and pretty soon we were "perceiving" that somebody we saw for the first time was an habitually tactful and punctilious, politically conservative, introverted, upperclass barrister, with a father complex, who was on his way to a psychotic episode. Then, there were still more fields to conquer as psychologists conducting "person-perception" experiments began to provide autobiographical data and test-findings to be "perceived." Enough said to explain my general agreement with Taft's dissatisfaction relative to pan-perceptionism expressed in

his systematic survey and, unhappily, my disagreement with MacLeod on this semantic issue.

It is useful to have two terms (for me, they are perception and apperception), partly because there are typological differences between those who, in their descriptions, limit themselves literally to the perceptible qualities of other persons (the sheer facts) and those who give you a host of inferences about imperceptible states, processes, and dispositions (these I term *perspections*—to "look through" the surface manifestations), and also, very often, placements (in this or that status, type, category), explanations and predictions. In my language, apperception includes at least these four distinguishable processes: (immediate) perspection, placement, explanation, and prediction (anticipation).

All this becomes clear enough in the rich and informative protocols derived from From's most original experiments, particularly the second. In my opinion, what he shows, besides many other things, is that the total covert experience of a perceptor of a subject's physical movements, acts, and words includes a galaxy of imaginations pertaining to the subject's momentary inner states and subsequent acts, as well as muscular tensions, somatic sensations, feelings, and evaluations, placements, explanations of various sorts, and further predictions, not to speak of impulses and decisions to intervene or actual, overt expressions of approval or disapproval. It is not possible to describe the perceptor's experience without using additional words, without indicating that the perceptor is also an imaginer, perspector, interpreter, evaluator, predictor, ordinator, and so forth. "He reached in his pocket for a match" would be (in my terminology) a "perspection" of the alter's intention; but "he took a match out of his pocket" (when he did no such thing) would be what? an actual perception? an imaginal anticipation recalled as an actual perception? or a hallucination? I trust that the accomplished X will be capable of settling these various semantic issues, and that, between our day and his day, many experimenters will have followed Tagiuri's inviting lead, and with comparable clarity and style, defined more of the cues which help us to perspect correctly the psychic states and traits in other people. I venture to predict that experiments in person-apperception will be performed in conjunction with studies of the assessment process and that the offspring of their union will be outstanding.

The only substantive contribution to the present volume which is devoted to an analysis of situations involving adult personalities is the finely-wrought and perspicacious chapter by Mailloux and Ancona. The authors present brief, pertinent case reports supportive of their contention that any one of the classical psychopathological syndromes (e.g. phobic, obsessive-compulsive, paranoid) may be provoked not only by a moral conflict of a sexual or social nature, but also by a moral conflict of a religious nature, occasioned, say, by a waning of genuine involvement, and belief. Loss of faith, its distressful concomitants and consequences, is a not uncommon variety of human experience, which the majority of psychologists either disregard entirely (never mentioning it in their textbooks), or, if they be clinicians, set aside as something which does not require study in its own right, on the assumption that all the determinants of a patient's suffering are operating on a deeper, unconscious level, dating, possibly, from an over-dependent, yet highly ambivalent, father-son relationship in childhood. The widely acknowledged fact that the persistence of a convincing, superpersonal "ideology" (religion, philosophy of life, or set of cultural values and ideals) is conducive, in many people, to psychic health, unity, serenity, and joy, and that the loss of it may be shattering, is all too often overlooked by psychoanalytically oriented psychiatrists and clinical psychologists, despite their own experience of being encouraged and sustained in their endeavors by a belief in the essential validity and efficacy of Freud's theories and procedures, as well as by a more embracing belief in the value of science and scientific psychotherapy. In a sense, psychoanalysis is their religion, although for them moral commitment is likely to be less binding than it is for devout Christians. A better analogy would be the attachment of fully indoctrinated Communists to their system of beliefs. In any case, it seems to me, the evidence is favorable to Mailloux's and Ancona's thesis that conflicts on this superordinate level may be protracted and intense in some people, productive of patho-

logical symptoms, and hence deserving of being considered on their own terms. But must we necessarily agree with the authors' implicit assumption that Catholicism is the sole occupant of the superordinate region of personality?

POPULATION TRENDS

Academic psychology, which subsisted for many years on a meager diet of responses from educated, European, male adults, has been substantially invigorated by the initiation and growth of a succession of other population trends, exemplified by the study of animals, of females, infants, children, and adolescents, of neurotics and psychotics, of subjects of different societies and cultures, of different somatotypes, psychological types, degrees of intelligence, social classes, and vocations, and now of an emergent trend, marked by studies of aging men and women. What other possibilities are left for the conscientious X to record or to foresee?

TECHNICAL TRENDS

I will now ask you to imagine a large section of X's encyclopedic book devoted to an analysis of all known procedures into their component parts and to an account of the different combinations of these components as they have occurred in the history of psychology. Besides (a) different kinds of objects or materials presented—which could be subsumed under (situational) regions-there are (b) different modes and conditions of presentation (e.g. tachistoscope), (c) different kinds of directions given (e.g. "Speak the first word that comes to mind"), and (d) different kinds of recording techniques (e.g. tape, moving-picture, camera, electrocardiograph). Some of these have already been mentioned in connection with the survey of regions; some are set forth and judiciously weighed in David's and Rabinowitz's review of brief projective methods; some are well described in other chapters too numerous to mention; but the majority I shall entrust to the analytic and synthetic powers

of the indefatigable X. My pet hope, as confessed earlier, is that he will lay sufficient stress on ways of studying the not-yet-defined "whole" person as well as on a trend which, in his day, will be moving toward the systematic training of psychologists as instruments of exact perception and adequate interpretation.

By the time X's book is underway, computing machines should have produced a very consequential revolution, having made possible, on the one hand, the precise determination of numerous interrelationships of clinically estimated variables within a single personality, and having encouraged, on the other hand, the construction of a galaxy of new questionnaires leading to the identification of basic factors and of empirical scales to measure them. There is no telling how far from actuality we may be getting in a few years as a result of the propagation of more and more wholly abstract, paper-and-pencil personalities. In any event, this section of X's book will be useful in so far as it elucidates the processes and determinants of technical invention and suggests to workers in one region methods that have proved their worth in others.

THEORETICAL TRENDS

Allusions to some of the items that belong under this heading are dispersed over the length of this chapter. A number of today's more favored concepts and theories were named in my commentary on Allport's introduction to the first volume of *Perspectives*. Later, various psychological constructs derived from the more basic sciences were listed, most of which are involved in endeavors to compose a system-of-system's frame of reference. Other conceptions were included, implicitly or explicitly, in my survey of regional trends exemplified by researches reported in this book. The findings of several authors—Brengelmann, From, Luria, and Mailloux and Ancona, for example—seem to point to some required conceptual or theoretical revision or innovation. Still more pertinent at this point is the one chapter of this collection which is primarily devoted to theory construction: Blum's definition of a brave and promising

model (out of parts of psychoanalytic theory and information theory) in terms of which predictions respecting certain classes of responses to his Blacky Test can be made and tested. His first trials were encouraging and it looks as if modified forms of the model would be applicable to other situations.

Also relevant to the present topic is Hollander's critique of the concept of conformity as a personological variable, a critique which, in most respects, is applicable across the board of conceptualized general dispositions, and, pushed a little further, might cancel the hope of ever arriving at a sufficient formulation of a personality. Crucial here is the everlasting generality vs. specificity issue. How often has any needful, directional disposition been repeatedly observed or measured in enough different kinds of situations to justify our speaking of a diffuse, freefloating, general disposition—a disposition to achieve results, to compete, to gain attention or approval, to direct others, to comply, to resist, to empathize, to emulate, to withdraw, to avoid, to construct, et cetera? But if we adopt the opposite, extreme position and cleave to the particularities of events (which are always unique) we shall come out, at best, with a list of scores on particular tests taken under particular conditions and/or a biography or case history composed of a number of particular endeavors and experiences, with no justification for conceiving of the existence of more general and enduring dispositions. A mid-position-which I favor and which Hollander might be willing to accept-requires a classification of types of situations (A, B, C, D, etc.), in terms of which dispositional specifications can be given. One might say, for instance, that subject S is consciously or unconsciously disposed to conform to the patterns of behavior or to the consensual expectations of others in situations of type C (e.g. characterized by the presence of "authority figures") less readily, less exactly, and/or less frequently than most subjects of his age; but that he conforms more readily, more exactly, and/or more frequently than most subjects in situations of type G (e.g. informal peer group), et cetera. Of course, to predict behavior in any particular situation, a number of other specifications would be required. In any case, a personologist seldom, if ever, arrives at anything more than a plausible and

probabilistic formulation of potential, semi-general and semi-specific, interdependent dispositions and abilities, which will serve as *one* basis for predictions of behavior in the future.

What the profound X will have to say about theoretical evolutions related to personality research is beyond me. I would suppose that the present puritan trend towards cleanliness of language and immaculate conceptions, with physics as fashionplate, will continue for a while with fresh flowerings of snobbery. But sooner or later with a little luck, we should grow wise enough to bend down to the humbling proposal that psychology, infant among the sciences, might advisably return to short pants, and begin again, nearer to the beginning, in contact with the naturalistic facts, instead of dressing up in the toobig authority of its father's embarrassingly long trousers. Of course, if the majority of personologists-in accord with present experiential (phenomenological, existential) trends-do return to the naturalistic facts, they will be greatly advantaged by the purifying mentations of today's more fastidious theorists and in retrospect will gratefully bless them for their illuminating treatises, most particularly for their demonstrations (instead of mere hunches) as to why, in the sphere of personology, perfection of diction and of definition is highly correlated with paralysis and barrenness.

The heart of X's massive work will undoubtedly be found in the several chapters he devotes to the classification and chronology of theoretical trends. In accord with the bent ascribed to him, what he will do first, I guess, is to analyze each theory into its basic components, or ideational genes, and then, going back to the genesis of each, trace the careers, the marriages and divorces, the decompositions and recompositions of these genes, showing how they became incorporated in the theoretical systems that are now in process of evolution.

Mr. X may choose to divide theories and hypotheses according to their chief focus of concern, such as propositions respecting (a) the microdevelopment of one, or the succession or interdependence (co-variation) of two or more, reported, covert, psychic states, processes, or products; (b) one or more momentary, situational or relational-situational determinants or

modifiers of covert or overt dispositional processes or effects; (c) one or more momentary, physiological, pharmacological or pathological determinants or modifiers; (d) one or more immediately antecedent experiences as determinants or modifiers; (e) one or more hypothetical establishments of personality (e.g. persisting dispositions and aims, integrates and patterns of dispositions, systems of patterns; cathected images, configurations, concepts, postulates, or formulations; regions, places, and boundaries, e.g. id-ego) or one or more of their hypothetical properties as determinants or modifiers; (f) genetical-maturational (e.g. inheritance, sex, age) determinants or modifiers of one or more establishments of personality; (g) one or more extraordinary or recurrent experiences or enterprises (e.g. accidents, successes or failures of endeavors, social treatments, the acquisition of knowledge through listening and reading) as determinants or modifiers of one or more establishments of personality; (h) one or more established, territorial and social positions and relations (e.g. family position, group memberships, roles, friendships, marriage) as determinants or modifiers of one or more establishments of personality; (i) some type of mental illness as determinant or modifier of one or more establishments of personality; and so forth.

Whether or not Mr. X happens to be interested in the personalities of the different theorists, he might choose to characterize their formulations in terms of such familiar ratios of emphasis as: overt, perceptible/covert, imperceptible, experiential variables; conscious, covert/unconscious, covert variables; empirical, phenomenological/hypothetical, theoretical variables; analytic/synthetic variables; energic, dynamic/static, structural; independent/relational variables; conceptions or flexible, changing/fixed, permanent variables; temporal, successional, historic/stationary, cross-sectional, unhistoric; conceptions of flexible, changing/fixed, permanent variables; psychophysiological/psychosociological variables; modal, stylistic expressional/purposive, directional terminal variables; proximal, purposive/distal, purposive variables, and so forth.

But now, having occupied more than my allotted space, I must leave in your hands all further speculations as to how our

future author will deal with the complex thought-stuff that marks the history of our science. My sole, confident prediction is that his bents of interest and evaluation will bear no resemblance to mine. May he have a galaxy of clarifying and generative new theories to report!

References

1. Allport, G. W. European and American theories of personality. In David, H. P. and von Bracken, H. (Eds.), *Perspectives in personality theory*. New York: Basic Books, 1957, 3-24.